Does Higher Inflation Lead to More Uncertain Inflation?
A. Steven Holland N recent years, many countries have experienced "stagflation," a period of high and rising inflation and unemployment. Over this time, higher inflation increasingly has come to be blamed for higher unemployment and reduced growth of real output. This contrasts sharply with previously held notions that there was either a long-run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment or a "natural rate of unemployment" regardless of the inflation rate.
One reason why many people have changed their minds about inflation's impact on the economy is the presumed impact of"inflation uncertainty." Many now argue that there is greater uncertainty about future prices during periods of higher inflation.
1 This increased uncertainty leads to a less efficient allocation of resources.
The best-known statement of this view came from Milton Friedman in his Nobel Lecture. Briefly stated, Friedman argued that greater inflation uncertainty shortens the average duration of contracts and reduces the efficiency of the price system. These two forces combine to lower' the growth rate of real output and potentially increase the rate of unemployment. 2
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Louis. Jude L. Naes, Jr., provided research assistance. 'Some have suggested that uncertainty begins to increase once the rate of inflation rises above some threshold. For example, see Logue and Willett (1976) and Hater and Heyne-Hafer (1981) . 2 Friedman (1977) . He suggests that the natural rate hypothesis holds for the very tong run (a period of decades), because the economy's institutional structure for dealing with inflation eventually will adjust to eliminate the real effects of inflation.
Thus, if reducing inflation produces sufficiently larger' output growth and lower unemployment in the long run, it is a worthwhile venture, even if doing so would produce a large short-term loss of output and rise in unemployment.
3 While Friedman's discussion primarily concerns the variability of inflation -not necessarily identical to the notion of inflation uncertainty -it is clear that he considers them to be closely related.
This argument can be split into three separate hypotheses: (1) higher inflation leads to greater variability of inflation; (2) greater inflation variability implies greater uncertainty about future inflation; and (3 greater inflation uncertainty has a detrimental effect on economic activity. For' policymakers to be concerned about the relevance of hypothesis 3, they must believe that they can influence the level of inflation uncertainty. Hypotheses I and 2 state that they can do this by controlling the rate of inflation, If exogenous factors, such as energy shocks, are primarily responsible for' greater inflation uncer'tainty, then policymakers can do little to affect it. This article focuses on the validity of the first two hypotheses, which together imply that higher inflation leads to greater inflation uncertainty. Besides analyzing the causes of inflation uncertainty, an assessment of its potential effects is presented as well.
Since energy shocks have been the single most important factor accounting for temporary price level changes, this article also investigates the impact of changes in the relative price of energy on both the rate of inflation and the level of inflation uncertainty.
4 Energy shocks and inflation uncertainty should be positively associated, because the magnitude and timing of the effects of an energy shock on the rate of inflation are bound to be viewed with uncertainty.
WHAT IS INFLATION UNCERTAINTY?
tnflation uncertainty arises from a lack of complete knowledge about how future price levels are determined. Of course, an individual typically will have enough information to make some forecast of future inflation rates. A given estimate of next period's inflation can be thought of as the mean of some underlying probability distribution.
The forecaster's inflation uncertainty may be estimated by looking at the size of some specified confidence interval for his forecast. For example, a person may have predicted at the end of 1982 that 1983 inflation had a 90 percent probability of being between 3 percent and 5 percent. Ifthe same individual's 90 percent confidence interval for 1984 inflation (forecast at the end of 1983) is wider, say 4 percent to 7 percent, then his uncertainty about 1984 inflation is greater than it was for 1983 inflation.
The analysis presented here deals with inflation uncertainty for a representative individual. Though the level of an individual's uncertainty about inflation is not directly observable, ways ofestimating it have been suggested in the literature. One of these is to use the variance or standard deviation of the errors made in forecasting inflation. A forecaster is trying to predict the outcome of a process that has both systematic and random components. With an unbiased forecast ofthe irlflation rate, the variance of the forecast errors indicates the importance of the random component and can be consider'ed an estimate of the level of inflation uncertainty.
5 An implicit assumption in this type of analysis is that the variance need not be constant but may vary over time.
4 See Tatom (1981). 5 it is the ex ante, not the ex post, variance of forecast errors that is relevant. Estimates of the latter, however, are commonly used as proxies for inflation uncertainty. See, for example, Klein (1978) , Engle (1983) , and Pagan, Hat and Trivedi (1983) .
WHY DOES INFLATION UNCERTAINTY

MAVFER?
The real effects of inflation uncertainty arise in part because inflation expectations enter into the contracting process. Any contract that provides for' payment in nominal rather than real terms incorporates an expectation of f'uture inflation. If actual inflation ends up higher than was expected when the contract was made, a redistribution of wealth occurs: those making the contracted nominal payments gain and those receiving them lose. If actual inflation is lower than was expected, the opposite wealth redistribution occurs.
When there is greater inflation uncertainty, riskaverse individuals will attempt to shorten the duration of contracts to reduce the risk of loss caused by deviations of actual from expected inflation. More frequent negotiation of contracts will divert economic resources to the contracting process from other, previously more efficient uses. 6
As the accompanying insert demonstrates, greater inflation uncertainty increases the risk associated with both saving and investing, since both require a contract of some kind, Individuals faced with greater inflation uncertainty may choose to reduce both their planned savings and investment. The result is likely to be lower long-term real economic growth.
Another potential real effect of inflation uncertainty is reduced efficiency of the price system in allocating resources. The basic idea is this; the more uncertain is inflation, "the harder it becomes to extract the signal about relative prices from the absolute prices." 7 Because individual prices adjust to unexpected inflation at different rates due to the presence of long-term contracts and the costs of adjusting prices, relative prices may be temporarily distorted. 5 They also maybe incorrectly perceived, because information does not flow smoothly across markets. As a result, economic efficiency is reduced, producing lower output gro%vth°I ndexationof contracts can reduce (though not totally eliminate) the risk associated with contracting, and one would expect indexation to increase as inflation uncertainty increases, For a theoretical analysis of indexation in this context, see Gray (1978) . Klein finds evidence that an increase in "long-term price uncertainty" leads to a reduction in the average term to maturity of outstanding corporate debt. 7 Friedman, p. 467. Again, Friedman's discussion is in terms of inflation variability; if this variability were anticipated, however, adjustments could be made that reduce or eliminate this effect. His discussion of this effect is based on the work of Hayek (1945) and Lucas (1973) among others. 8 See Bordo (1980) and Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) . and possibly higher unemployment than if all relative sion of relative price changes leads to a significant prices were correctly perceived. 0 reduction in real GNP and increased unemployment.
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The notion that greater inflation uncertainty leads to reduced economic growth and higher unemployment has been supported by empirical research. Mullineaux finds some measures of inflation uncertainty to have a negative effect on the growth of industrial production and a positive effect on unemployment; Levi and Makin get similar results for employment growth. Furthermore, Blejer and I,iederman find that increased disper-°C arlton(1981) discusses in detail the impact of inflation uncertainty on the organization of markets. He concludes that (p. 19):
in response to inflationary uncertainty, we expect to see fewer contracts with tixed prices for long time-periods, fewer customized goods, greater use of standardized goods sold in a liquid market, a move from outside contracting ot customized goods to internal production through vertical integration, and a move from vertical integration to reliance on standard quality goods sold in a liquid market where "the market" price is easy to observe, All of these changes are undesirable from an efficiency standpoint.
WHY SHOULD HIGHER INFLATION LEAD TO GREATER INFLATION UNCERTAINTY?
The relationship between higher rates of inflation and inflation uncertainty is based more on empirical regularities than on theoretical rationale. Beginning with Okun in 1971, several researchers have found that there are significant positive correlations between rates of inflation and the variability of inflation across countries and across time fot-a given country. Others 10 5ee Mullineaux (1980) , Levi and Makin (1980) , and Blejer and Leiderman (1980) . Evans (1983) finds an unstable price level to have a negative effect on real GNP growth, and Able (1980) finds a negative impact of inflation variabitity on the rate of investment.
have found a positive relationship between inflation variability (or inflation itself) and proxies for inflation uncertainty, the latter including the dispersion ofinflation expectations across survey respondents and the variance of estimated inflation forecast errors. The insert on pages 20 and 21 provides a summary of findings from previous studies.
The theoretical rationale centers on the hypothesis that a more inflationary economy produces greater' uncertainty about the future direction of government policy, causing greater uncertainty about future inflation. Okun states that the application of fiscal and monetary policies is apt to be less consistent (i.e., predictable) during inflationary times because ofthe difficulty in reducing inflation without causing unacceptably high rates of unemployment and interest. 1 ' In a similar vein, Friedman states that:
A burst ofinflation produces strong pressure to counter it. Polity goes from one direction to the other, encouraging wide variation in the actual and anticipated rate ofinflation. And, ofcourse, in such an environment, no one has single-valued anticipations. Everyone recognizes that there is great uncertainty about what actual inflation will turn out to be over any specific future interval.' 2
One can argue that an inflationary economy creates an environment in which major policy changes become more likely and the effects of such policy changes become more uncertain. To support this argument, one need only look at some of the policy measures taken or proposed in recent years at least partially in response to an inflationary economy: deregulation of financial institutions, wage and price controls, indexation of income taxes and changes in methods for implementing monetary policy.
INFLATION FORECASTS AND THE VARIANCE OF ERRORS
The discussion above suggests that the variance of errors in forecasting inflation could be used as one measure of inflation uncertainty. If the variance of the forecast errors remains constant over time, so does the level of inflation uncertainty. One way to determine whether inflation uncertainty has changed over time is to test for non-constant variance (i.e.) heteroscedasticitvl in the residuals from a model of inflation expectations. 14 ''See Okun (1971) , ' 2 priedman, p. 466.
' 3 This is the approach suggested by Engle (1982) and Pagan, Hall and Trivedi.
First, we need an inflation expectations model that provides unbiased forecasts over both lower' and higher inflation periods; we can then test whether the error variance is larger for the higher inflation period. A model obtained by regressing the quarterly growth rate of the GNP deflator (~)on its own lagged values, lagged values of the growth rate of Ml (Mi, and dummy variables fur periods of wage-price controls and their after'-math (Dl and D2) is given by equation 1 in table j,t4 The equation was estimated using data from 11/1954-ill! ' 4 AIl growth rates are expressed in annualized log differences. Dl has a unity value during the control period of 111/1971-I/i 973 and zero otherwise. D2 represents the period during which controls were being phased out, taking a unity value for the period I/I 973-I/I 975 and zero otherwise.
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, and the number of lags was chosen using standard t and F tests. When we divide the sample into a lower inflation period, ll/1954-1V/1967, and a higher inflation per'iod, 1!1968-lll!l983, we can reject the hypothesis that the error variance is the same in both periods. ' 5 As expected, the variance is higher in the period of higher inflation.' 4
Another test of the constancy of the variance of the forecast errors over time is obtained by regressing the squared value ofthe inflation forecast error for period (e~) estimated from equation 1 on the variables thought to cause changes in the variance. When four lagged values of the inflation rate are used, the estimated equation yields the results shown in equation I in table 2. The results indicate, once again, that inflation affects the variance of forecast errors using this model of ex-' 5 The average quarterly rate of growth of the GNP deflator between lI/i 954 and IV/l 967 was 2.18 with a maximum of 4.57 and a minimum of '-0.87; for 1/1968-Ill/i 983, the average growth rate of the GNP deflator was 6.31 with a maximum of 11.41 and a minimum of 2.83. The value of the calculated F-statistic (F 53~1
.77) from the Goldfeld-Quandt test is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. For an explanation of this test for heteroscedasticity, see Goldfeld and Quandt (1965 
Relative Energy Price Changes and Expected Inflation
The above result seems to suggest rather strongly that a higher inflation rate is associated with more inflation uncertainty. This conclusion must be carefully viewed, however-; the results are quite sensitive to the way in which the model of inflation expectations is specified. In particular, if one considers the possibility that individuals anticipate some impact of a higher Engle (1982) . ' 8 The f-statistic for the sum of the coefficients is 2.59. Additional lagged values of~up to a total of 12 had no effect. Lagged values of the rate of inflation are used instead of the current rate, because the rate for period t is not known at the time the forecast is made, This procedure of regressing squared residuals on a set ot variables as a test for heteroscedasticity is suggested by Breusch and Pagan (1979) .
'l'he relative price of energy is defined as the ratio of the "fuels and related products and power" component ofthe producer price index (PPI) to the business sector deflator, See Tatom for a slightly different model of the inflation rate itself (rather than expected inflation). 20
The Goldfeld-Ouandt F-statistic is F 5 ,~= 1.47. 21 Neither the value of TA 2 (4.72) nor the sum of the coefficients of lagged inflation (0.112, t = 1.44) are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Cukierman and Wachtel (1982) . There is, however, an alternative explanation for
In the analysis to follow, it is assumed that greater dispersion of inflation forecasts among individuals leads to increased inflation uncertainty. Therefore, we The root-mean-squared error (RMSE) of the individual forecasts of inflation from the survey serves as the second proxy for inflation uncertainty. An examination of chart 1 indicates that the survey mean inflation expectation is biased; it consistently underpredicts the inflation rate over most of the sample penod. The RMSE of the inflation forecasts incorpo-
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The correlation coefficient between the standard deviation and the expected inflation rate is 0.787 for the entire period and 0.667 for the period omitting the two energy shock periods. Between the standard deviation and the actual inflation rate, the correlations are 0.724 and 0.597, respectively. These figures are all statistically significant at the 5 percent level, rates these errors. The squared value of this variable is the sum of the variance of inflation expectations across sun'e respondents (the standard deviation squared) and the squared forecast error using the survey mean as the expected inflation rate 20 The use of this variable
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The mean-squared error of the forecasts can be written:
where n is the number of forecasters,~t' is the expected rate of inflation for the ith forecaster, and~* is the mean expected inflation rate among the forecasters, The first term on the right-hand side of the equation is the squared forecast error, and the second is the variance of individual inflation expectations. We use the square root of this variable and the standard deviation of expectations because regressions using the mean-squared error and the variance exhibited heteroscedasficity. Chart 2 plots the B.MSE along with the actual inflation rate and the mean expected inflation rate from the survey. Again there is a positive association between the uncertainty measure and the other two series, with the largest increases in RMSE occuning during periods of energy shocks.
28 As chart 2 shows) the RMSE is
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The standard deviation of the forecasts 'has one advantage over RMSE as a proxy for inflation uncertainty: it does not contain any ex post information. RMSE~~I includes the actual inflation rate from period t+1,2 8 The correlation coefficient between RMSE and the expected inflation rate is 0.559 for the entire sample period and 0.433 for the period exclusive of the periods of energy shocks. Between RMSE and the actual rate of inflation, the correlations are 0.826 and 0.658, respectively.
considerably more variable than the standard deviation over the sample period. The most interesting difference in the two series, however, is their behavior during the energy shock periods: the standard deviation remains higher than normal throughout each of the energy shock periods and does not decline until the period is over'; the RMSE peaks, then declines substantially while relative energy prices are still rising. Therefore, these two measures imply different responses of inflation uncertainty to energy shocks.
INFLATION AND THE VARIABILITY OF INFLATION FORECASTS
This section provides more detailed evidence on the effects of inflation and energy shocks on the two measures of inflation uncertainty discussed above. Table 3 presents results from regressions based on six-month inflation forecasts. The data used are from the same sample period shown in the charts. In equation 1, the dependent variable is SD~,)I,, which is the standard deviation of inflation expectations for' period t + 1 as calculated from responses to the Livingston survey at period t. 29 The most recent six-month rate of inflation known to the forecasters,~, has a positive and strongly significant effect on the standard deviation of the forecasts, Lagged values of this variable had no significant effect. The value of the 29 The variable is written SD,~1iI, to indicate that it is based on forecasts of period t + 1 inflation given an information set from period t, It. The series for the inflation rate and changes in the relative price of energy are constructed to include the most recent numbers known by the forecaster, so monthly data are used. The spring forecaster is assumed to know the April levels of the CPI and the relative price of energy, so the six-month rate of change is calculated between October and April. For the fall forecast, the rate is calculated between April and October. The denominator in the relative energy price variable for monthly data is the finished goods component of the PPI. 3t The regressions also were run with a somewhat different dependent variable, the standard deviation across individuals of the expected /evel of the CPI divided by the mean expected level, This is the coefficient of variation of the CF'I level forecasts, The results were similar to those for the standard deviation of the inflation rate forecasts. The coefficient of variation of the inflation rate forecasts is clearly an inappropriate variable to use, since, as the expected inflation rate approaches zero, the coefficient of variation approaches infinity. 
Inflation's Effect on the Standard Deviation of Forecasts
inflation had on the standard deviation, the constant term is nearly twice as high in this equation; thus, the impacts actually are quite similar. The initial impact of inflation on RMSE is much greater than it is on the standard deviation, but this effect is partially offset after 24 months have passed.
The impact of relative energy price changes is quite different in this regression than it was in equation 1.
The initial impact on the uncertainty measure is positive, but the effect is totally offset 12 months later. 33
Consequently, if the relative price of energy were to increase by the same amount each period, it would cease to have any effect on the BMSE after 12 months. In contrast, for the standard deviation of expectations to stabilize, the level rather than the growth rate of the relative price of energy must stabilize. 34
In both equations, the effect of higher inflation on the measure of inflation uncertainty is positive and permanent. There is no indication that, over time, forecasters come to be just as certain about higher rates of inflation as they were about lower rates. This evidence supports the hypothesis that higher inflation leads to more uncertain inflation.
CONCLUSION
Researchers have compiled considerable evidence suggesting that the rate and variability of inflation are positively related and a lesser amount ofevidence linking these variables to inflation uncertainty. This article has explored the relationship between the rate of inflation and the level of inflation uncertainty in greater detail, looking also at the impact of energy shocks on inflation uncertainty.
The empirical results presented here are soniewhat mixed and are sensitive to the method chosen for measuring inflation uncertainty. On the one hand, a model of inflation expectations was introduced and estimated for which the variance of the estimated inflation forecast errors is related to the rate of inflation. Ã
